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HOUSEHOLD HETEROGENEITY AND OPTIMAL INTER-TEMPORAL
PRICING FOR A DURABLE-GOOD MONOPOLY
WINSTON T.H. KOH
School of Economics and Social Sciences
Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903, Singapore
winstonkoh@smu.edu.sg
In this paper, I extend the analysis in Koh (2006) to examine the optimality of inter-temporal price
discrimination for a durable-good monopoly in a model where infinitely-lived households consume
both durable goods and a stream of non-durable goods subject to different inter-temporal budget con-
straints. I also consider the multi-dimensional setting where households differ in both inter-temporal
budget constraints and the utilities they derive from the consumption of the durable good.
Keywords: Durable good; monopoly; inter-temporal price discrimination.
1. Introduction
Most models of inter-temporal price discrimination trace the source of such pricing
opportunities to institutional features such as market segmentation, existence of asymmetric
information as well as industry practices, but rarely to household heterogeneity. Koh (2006)
investigates the optimality of inter-temporal price discrimination (IPD) in a setting where
households consume a durable good and a stream of a non-durable good, subject to an inter-
temporal budget constraint. The durable good is supplied by a monopoly that can credibly
commit to its pricing policy. It is shown that when households differ in the utilities that
they derive from the consumption of the durable good, an IPD sales strategy is optimal even
when households possess the same inter-temporal discount rate as the monopoly. This result
is in contrast to the findings in Stokey (1979) and Landsberger and Meilijson (1985), where
consumers do not face an inter-temporal budget constraint or consume a non-durable good;
as a result, an IPD sales strategy is dominated by a constant price policy.
In this paper, we extend the analysis presented in Koh (2006) to consider the situation
where households derive the same utilities from the consumption of the durable good, but
differ in their inter-temporal budgets. We demonstrate that the optimal sales strategy for
the durable-good monopoly is an IPD strategy. The direct proof presented in this paper (in
Proposition 1) is considerably more complicated than for the case considered in Koh (2006),
where households face identical inter-temporal budget constraint.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a model of household consumption
subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint. In Section 3, we solve for the monopoly’s
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optimal sales strategy and prove that it does not entail a constant price. In Section 4, we
extend the analysis to a multi-dimensional setting. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
A monopoly supplies a costlessly-produced infinitely durable good to infinitely-lived house-
holds that also consume a stream of instantaneously perishable non-durable good subject to
an inter-temporal budget constraint. The supply of the non-durable good is perfectly elastic
at a unit price. The monopoly is able to credibly commit to a pricing policy P(t) and to sell
the durable good for a period of length T , after which sales end.
A household’s utility function at time t is given by (A + st X)αq(1−α)t , where st = 0 if
the new durable good is not purchased at time t , and st = 1 if it has been purchased at t
or earlier; A is a constant; X is the identical per period utility that each household derives
from the new durable good; qt is the amount of non-durable good consumed at time t;α ∈
(0, 1) measures the relative importance of the consumption of the durable good in the utility
function.
We consider first the situation where households differ only in their inter-temporal budget
Y , where Y ∈ [Y −, Y +], and f (Y ) is the density function of Y . Let z denote the date of
purchase of the durable good, r denote the common rate of discount for the households and
the monopoly, and {qt0} and {qt1} denote, respectively, the household’s consumption plan of
the non-durable good before and after the purchase of the durable good. The present value
of a household’s utilities is
W (z, {qt0}, {qt1}) =
∫ z
0
Aαqt0(1−α)e−rt dt +
∫ ∞
z
(A + X)αqt1(1−α)e−rt dt, (1)
while the inter-temporal budget constraint is
P(z)e−rz +
∫ z
0
e−rt qt0dt +
∫ ∞
z
e−rt qt1dt ≤ Y. (2)
Each household’s maximization problem is given by the following Lagrangian (L P):
L(z, {qt0}, {qt1}, λ)
= W (z, {qt0}, {qt1}, Y ) + λ
{
Y − P(z)e−rz −
∫ z
0
e−rt qt0dt +
∫ ∞
z
e−rt qt1dt
}
. (3)
Differentiating LP with respect to qt0 and qt1 yields the following optimality condition:
A
qt0
= A + X
qt1
=
[
λ
1 − α
] 1
α
. (4)
The condition in Equation (4) implies that qt0 and qt1 are constant for t =[0, z) and t =
[z,∞), respectively. We denote the optimal per period consumption of the non-durable
good before and after the purchase of the durable good by q0(Y ) and q1(Y ), respectively.
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Let z(Y ) denote the optimal purchase date for the durable good. Differentiating LP in
Equation (3) with respect to z, the first-order condition for z(Y ) when it is an interior solution,
is given by
βr X
[
Y − P(z(Y ))e−rz(Y )
A + Xe−rz(Y )
]
= r P(z(Y )) − d P(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=z(Y )
, (5)
where β ≡ α/(1 − α). The necessary second-order condition for z(Y ) is
r
d P(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=z(Y )
− d
2 P(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=z(Y )
< 0. (6)
Denote the household’s optimal consumption plan by {z(Y ), q0(Y ), q1(Y )}. A household’s
utility under the optimal consumption plan can be shown to be
V (z(Y ), Y ) =
[
A + Xe−rz(Y )
r
]α [
Y − P(z(Y ))e−rz(Y )](1−α) . (7)
3. The Monopoly’s Optimal Sales Strategy
3.1. The feasible pricing policies
Using the first-order condition given in Equation (5) for z(Y ), the implicit differentiation of
z(Y ) with respect to Y yields
dz(Y )
dY
= βrY
{[
r
d P(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=z(Y )
− d
2 P(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=z(Y )
] [
A + Xe−rz(Y )]
− (β + 1)
[
r P(z(Y )) − d P(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=z(Y )
]}−1
< 0. (8)
Therefore, households with a larger budget would purchase the durable good earlier. Let
YL ≡ Min{Y ≥ Y −|z(Y ) is an interior solution}, YH ≡ Max{Y ≤ Y +|z(Y ) is an interior
solution}, and YM ∈ [Y −, YL) such that a household with Y = YM is indifferent between
buying the durable good at T , or not at all. If the marginal household YM does without the
durable good, its utility from consuming the non-durable good is (A/r )α YM (1−α). Using
Equation (7), we can solve for P(T ):
P(T ) = erT YM
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT
]β}
. (9)
The timing of the purchase is
Y ∈ [YH , Y +], z(Y ) = 0,
Y ∈ (YL, YH ), z(Y ) ∈ (0, T ), dz(Y )dY < 0,
Y ∈ [YM , YL], z(Y ) = T,
Y ∈ [Y −, YM), z(Y ) = ∞.
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Since z(Y ) is monotonic, we can invert z(Y ) to define a purchase schedule Y (t), implicitly
chosen by the monopoly for a feasible IPD pricing policy P(t), such that
t = 0, Y (t) ∈ [YH , Y +],
t ∈ (0, T ), Y (t) = z−1(t) ∈ (YL, YH ),
t = T, Y (t) ∈ [YM , YL],
t = ∞, Y (t) ∈ [Y −, YM),
where Y (t) satisfies, when it is an interior solution, the following conditions:
d P(t)
dt
−
[
1 + βXe
−rt
A + Xe−rt
]
rP(t) = − βr X
A + Xe−rt Y (t), (10)
dY (t)
dt
= − 1
βr X
[
r
dP(t)
dt
− d
2 P(t)
dt2
] [
A(t) + Xe−rt]
−
{
e−rt (β + 1)
β
}[
r P(t) − dP(t)
dt
]
< 0. (11)
To derive a feasible P(t), first multiply both sides of Equation (10) with the integrating
factor exp
{
r
∫ T
t
[
1 + βXe−rzA+Xe−rz
]
dz
}
to obtain{
dP(t)
dt
−
[
1 + βXe
−rt
A + Xe−rt
]
r P(t)
}
e
r
∫ T
t
[
1+ βXe−rzA+Xe−rz
]
dz = − βr XY (t)
A + Xe−rt e
r
∫ T
t
[
1+ βXe−rzA+Xe−rz
]
dz
.
(12)
Integrating both sides of Equation (12), this leads to
P(t) = e−r
∫ T
t
[
1+ βXe−rzA+Xe−rz
]
dz
×
{∫ T
t
βr XY (w)
A + Xe−rw e
r
∫ T
w
[
1+ βXe−rzA+Xe−rz
]
dzdw + erT YM
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT
]β}}
.
(13)
Next, we note that
exp
{
−r
∫ T
t
{
1 + βXe
−rz
A + Xe−rz
}
dz
}
= exp
{
−r(T − t) −
∫ T
t
βr Xe−rz
A + Xe−rz dz
}
= e−r(T −t)
[
A + Xe−rT
A + Xe−rt
]β
, (14)
so that substituting Equation (14) into (13), and using the boundary condition P(T ), we
obtain
P(t) =
∫ T
t
{
βr XY (z)
A + Xe−rz e
r(t−z)
[
A + Xe−rz
A + Xe−rt
]β}
dz
+ ert YM
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT
]β}[ A + Xe−rT
A + Xe−rt
]β
. (15)
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3.2. The monopoly’s revenue function
The monopoly’s revenue function, denoted (Y (t), YM, T ), is∫ Y +
Y −
e−rz(Y ) P(z(Y )) f (Y )dY =
∫ Y +
YH
P(0) f (Y )dY +
∫ YL
YM
e−rT P(T ) f (Y )dY
+
∫ YH
YL
e−rz(Y ) P(z(Y )) f (Y )dY .
Integrating by parts,
(Y (t), YM, T ) = [1 − F(YM)] e−rT P(T )
+
∫ YH
YL
e−rz(Y )
[
r P(z(Y )) − d P(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=z(Y )
]
dz(Y )
dY
[1 − F(Y )] dY .
Next, using the first-order condition for z(Y ), and using a change in variable, z(Y ) = t , we
obtain
(Y (t), YM , T ) = [1 − F(YM)] e−rT P(T )
+β
∫ T
0
{
r Xe−rt [1 − F(Y (t))]
A + Xe−rt
[
Y (t) − P(t)e−rt ]} dt . (16)
Substituting P(t) and P(T ) into Equation (16), and simplifying, we obtain
(Y (t), YM , T )
= YM [1 − F(YM)]
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT
]β}
+
∫ T
0
{
βr Xe−rt [1 − F(Y (t))]
A + Xe−rt
{
Y (t) −
∫ T
t
{
βr Xe−rzY (z)
A + Xe−rz
[
A + Xe−rz
A + Xe−rt
]β}
dz
− YM
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT
]β}[ A + Xe−rT
A + Xe−rt
]β}}
dt. (17)
3.3. The optimal sales strategy
Let {Y ∗(t), Y ∗M , T ∗} denote the optimal sales strategy of the durable-good monopoly. The
first-order conditions that characterize {Y ∗(t), Y ∗M , T ∗} are
Y ∗(t) : Y ∗(t) −
∫ T
t
{
βr Xe−rzY ∗(z)
A + Xe−rz
[
A + Xe−rz
A + Xe−rt
]β}
dz
− YM
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT
]β}[ A + Xe−rT
A + Xe−rt
]β
=
[
1 − βr Xe
−rt
A + Xe−rt
][
1 − F(Y ∗(t))
f (Y ∗(t))
]
, t ∈ [0, T ], (18)
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T ∗ :
∫ T ∗
0
{
βr Xe−rt
A + Xe−rt
[
A + Xe−rT ∗
A + Xe−rt
]β
[1 − F(Y (t))]
}
dt
= [1 − F(YL)] − YM
[
A
A + Xe−rT ∗
]β [F(YL) − F(YM)
YL − YM
]
, (19)
Y ∗M :
∫ T
0
{
βr Xe−rt
A + Xe−rt
[
A + Xe−rT
A + Xe−rt
]β
[1 − F(Y (t))]
}
dt
= [1 − F(Y ∗M)] − Y ∗M f (Y ∗M). (20)
Substituting the above first-order conditions into Equation (17), the monopoly’s revenue
function under the optimal sales strategy can be written as
(Y ∗(t), Y ∗
M
, T ∗) = Y ∗
M
[
1 − F(Y ∗
M
)
] {
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT ∗
]β}
+β
∫ T ∗
0
{
re−rt X
A + Xe−rt
[
1 − βr Xe
−rt
A + Xe−rt
] [1 − F(Y ∗(t))]2
f (Y ∗(t))
}
dt .
(21)
Proposition 1. The monopoly practices inter-temporal price discrimination under the opti-
mal sales strategy {Y ∗(t), Y ∗M , T ∗}.
Proof. The proof is as follows. Suppose, to the contrary, the optimal sales strategy involves
an optimal constant price P∗ over the period T ∗. Let Y ∗(t) be the associated optimal purchase
schedule. Using Equations (5) and (14),
P∗ = erT ∗Y ∗M
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT ∗
]β}
; (22a)
Y ∗(t) =
[
A + (β + 1)Xe−rt
βX
]
P∗. (22b)
Substituting into Equation (17), this in turn implies that the monopoly’s revenue func-
tion is
(Y ∗(t), Y ∗
M
, T ∗) = erT ∗Y ∗M
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT ∗
]β}{
e−rT
∗ [1 − F(Y ∗
M
)
]
+
∫ T ∗
0
re−rt
[
1 − F(Y ∗(t))] dt
}
. (23)
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Since the revenue function given in Equation (23) must be equivalent to the one given in
Equation (21), we obtain the following equality:
erT
∗
Y ∗M
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT ∗
]β}∫ T ∗
0
re−rt
[
1 − F(Y ∗(t))] dt
=
∫ T ∗
0
{[
βr Xe−rt
A + Xe−rt
]{
1 − βr Xe
−rt
A + Xe−rt
} [1 − F(Y ∗(t))]2
f (Y ∗(t))
}
dt, (24)
which simplifies to∫ T ∗
0
{
βXre−rt
A + Xe−rt
[
1 − F(Y ∗(t))]
{ [
A + Xe−rt
A + (β + 1)Xe−rt
]
Y ∗(t)
−
{
1 − βr Xe
−rt
A + Xe−rt
} [1 − F(Y ∗(t))]
f (Y ∗(t))
}}
dt = 0. (25)
Using the first-order condition in Equation (18), we can show that[
A + Xe−rt
A + (β + 1)Xe−rt
]
Y ∗(t) −
{
1 − βr Xe
−rt
A + Xe−rt
} [1 − F(Y ∗(t))]
f (Y ∗(t))
= − βXe
−rt Y ∗(t)
A + (β + 1)Xe−rt +
∫ T ∗
t
{
βr Xe−rzY ∗(z)
A + Xe−rz
[
A + Xe−rz
A + Xe−rt
]β}
dz
+ Y ∗M
{
1 −
[
A
A + Xe−rT ∗
]β}[ A + Xe−rT ∗
A + Xe−rt
]β
. (26)
Since β > 0, we have
− βXe
−rt Y ∗(t)
A + (β + 1)Xe−rt > −
βXe−rt Y ∗(t)
A + Xe−rt . (27)
Next, ∫ T ∗
t
{
βr Xe−rzY ∗(z)
A + Xe−rz
[
A + Xe−rz
A + Xe−rt
]β}
dz >
βr Xe−rt Y ∗(t)
A + Xe−rt . (28)
These two conditions in Equations (27) and (28) imply that the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (26) is always greater than zero. This in turn implies that the left-hand side of Equa-
tion (25) is always positive, which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, a constant price is not
a feature of the optimal sales strategy of the durable-good monopoly.
The intuition that an IPD strategy is optimal in our model is as follows. Each house-
hold must make a decision, given its inter-temporal budget constraint and the monopoly’s
announced pricing policy P(t), whether to purchase the new durable good, and when to do
so. The timing decision affects the budget share that will be allocated to the new durable
good, as well as the marginal utility [given by λ in Equation (4)] of consuming the stream
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of non-durable good. Suppose, for the moment, that the monopoly were to decide to sell
the new durable good at a uniform price. As shown in Equation (22b), even with uniform
pricing, households with a smaller inter-temporal budget constraint will optimally choose
to purchase it later, in order to increase the consumption of the non-durable good. Suppose
now the monopoly were to raise the price slightly at t = 0, and leave the price unchanged for
t ∈ (0, T ]. Some households with an inter-temporal budget constraint larger than YH would
be willing to continue to buy it at t = 0, while others may choose to delay the purchase,
including those with an inter-temporal budget of YH . By choosing a suitable small increase
in price at t = 0, the monopoly would be able to increase its profits.
4. The Multi-Dimensional Setting
In a general setting, households may differ in more than one dimension; in addition to
differences in the inter-temporal budget constraint (Y ), households may also differ in the
utilities they derive from the consumption of the durable good (X), and/or the utilities they
derive from the existing stock of durable good (A). In such a setting, IPD remains an optimal
sales strategy. To show that this is the case, let I denote (A, X , Y ), and z(I) denote the optimal
timing of purchase. Utilizing the earlier analysis in Section 2, the household’s utility under
the optimal consumption plan is given by
V (z(I), I) =
[
A + Xe−rz(I)
r
]α [
Y − P(z(I))e−rz(I)](1−α) . (29)
Suppose we fix A and X at ¯A and ¯X , respectively, and then vary Y by an amount Y such that
V (z(I), I)= V (z(I), ˆI), where ˆY ≡ Y + Y and ˆI ≡ ( ¯A, ¯X , ˆY ). This leads to the following
condition: [
A + Xe−rz(I)
¯A + ¯Xe−rz(I)
]α
=
[
ˆY − P(z(I))e−rz(I)
Y − P(z(I))e−rz(I)
](1−α)
. (30)
Next, in order that the optimal timing of purchase under I and ˆI is the same, i.e., z(I) = z(ˆI),
the first-order condition in Equation (6) must be satisfied as follows:
βr X
[
Y − P(z(I))e−rz(I)
A + Xe−rz(I)
]
= r P(z) − d P(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=z
= βr ¯X
[
ˆY − P(z(ˆI))e−rz(ˆI)
¯A + ¯Xe−rz(ˆI)
]
. (31)
This yields the following condition:
¯A + ¯Xe−rz(ˆI)
A + Xe−rz(I) =
¯X
X
[
ˆY − P(z(ˆI))e−rz(ˆI)
Y − P(z(I))e−rz(I)
]
. (32)
Suppose X is fixed at ¯X . Then, the conditions in Equations (30) and (32) imply that in order
that V (z(I), I) = V (z(ˆI), ˆI) and z(I) = z(ˆI) for all I, ¯A and ˆY must be chosen as follows:
¯A =
[
¯X
X
](1−α) [
A + Xe−rz(I)] − ¯Xe−rz(I), (33)
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ˆY =
[
X
¯X
]α [
Y − P(z(I))e−rz(I)] + P(z(I))e−rz(I). (34)
Therefore, while households may differ in several dimensions, their decision on the optimal
timing of purchase of the durable good can be made to correspond to the problem of a
particular household type where the difference is along only one dimension — the inter-
temporal budget constraint ˆY . It follows from an application of Proposition 1 that an IPD
pricing policy must be part of the optimal sales strategy for the multi-dimensional setting.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we relate the optimality of inter-temporal price discrimination to various sources
of household heterogeneity, in a model where households consume both durable goods and
a stream of non-durable goods. As discussed in Koh (2006), the optimal monopoly prices
may be increasing initially under certain circumstances. In these situations, households may
optimally choose to delay the purchase of the durable good and pay a higher price, since
they are also left with a larger budget to purchase and consume the non-durable good. The
optimal purchase time is chosen such that the marginal gain in utility from the consumption
of more of the non-durable good is equal to the marginal loss in utility from delaying the
consumption of the new durable good.
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